Tuesday, 7 June 2016

BRAZIL-What good does it do to have power...

...if you can’t abuse it?

Corruption is not new to the Brazilian scene. Some years ago there was a joke circulating in Brazil that a Brazilian diplomat in a meeting with the President, informed that a panel of judges had just elected Brazil as the second most corrupt country in the entire world. The President shook his head, clucked his tongue, and then asked, “What country was elected the most corrupt?” The diplomat responded, “Well, actually we were, but we managed to buy off a couple of the judges on the panel in order to ensure second place.”

The Chief Prosecutor of the Republic, Rodrigo Janot, has just issued a request for the arrest of former Cabinet Minister, Romero Jucá (Minister of Planning), President of the Senate Renan Calheiros, and former President  and current Senator for the State of Amapá, José Sarney. All are accused of obstruction of justice for planning to subvert the Lava-Jato investigations and limit the actions of the Federal Police and the Federal Public Prosecutor’s office. He also issued a request for the arrest of Eduardo Cunha whose mandate is supposed to be decided today by the “Ethics” Committee of the Lower Chamber of the legislature.

Local wags have suggested that Sarney has been in politics for so long that if he negotiates a plea bargain, he might be able to shed some light on whether Prometheus acted alone when he stole fire from the gods.

As the roster now stands, one President is awaiting trial (Dilma), and two ex-presidents are under investigation (Lula and Sarney), the arrests of the Presidents of the Senate and of the Lower Chamber have also been requested, so the situation begs the question of who is minding the store?

You might remember that when Dilma was suspended from office to await a decision that she would or would not stand trial for impeachment, she was given the use of an Air Force jet to zip around the country. That “perk” has now been rescinded and she can only requisition a jet to fly to and from her home in Rio Grande do Sul. Dilma was livid. She plans to fly to the City of Campinas today and may have to go on a commercial flight with “the people” (horrors!). Given her level of popularity with the general public, she might find the flight a “bit uncomfortable”!

As I wrote yesterday, plea bargains have also now indicated 13 governors and 36 senators in some form or other of corruption.

A significant number of those under investigation might be indicted and have to stand trial. Their trials will be conducted by the Supreme Court. That’s an impressive case load to add to those already flowing through the Court. How long all this could take is anyone’s guess.


Whew!!

Monday, 6 June 2016

BRAZIL-"Singing" in perfect harmony.

Will anyone be left standing?

Things are off to a good start this week. Four Lava-Jato suspects are negotiating plea-bargains that are cited by some as the equivalent of a political atomic bomb.

The four “singers” are: Marcelo Odebrecht (President of Odebrecht Construction Company – Brazil’s largest); Leo Pinheiro (former president of the OAS construction company);  Sergio Machado (former president of Transpetro – a Petrobrás subsidiary) and Nestor Cervero (former director at Petrobrás).

Odebrecht’s depositions have so far implicated 13 governors (50% of the total in Brazil) and 36 Senators (44% of the Senate).

Leo Pinheiro’s testimony indicated that the country retreat in Atibaia, São Paulo the ownership of which has been attributed to Lula and that Lula vigorously denies, was the object of numerous improvements that were requested by Lula. Pinheiro also referred to the beachfront triplex apartment in Guarujá, São Paulo as belonging to Lula.

Sergio Machado has indicated that Renan Calheiros, President of the Senate, Romero Jucá, recently dismissed as Minister of Planning in the Temer administration, and former President José Sarney divided R$60 million of bribe money.

Nestor Cerveró, currently serving a 17-year sentence for corruption and money laundering, offered his testimony that Dilma Rousseff was fully aware of the problems associated with the purchase by Petrobrás of a refinery in Texas. Dilma had denied she was aware of the enormous overprice and a couple of draconian clauses in the purchase contract that caused Petrobrás to lose upward of US$800k.

Both Odebrecht and Cerveró appear to “have the knife out” for Dilma Rousseff. Each claims that she sold them “down the river” (as they say in New Jersey). Both have provided damaging testimony. And Lula doesn’t come off any better!

The testimony of all four “singers” does not help Michel Temer very much either.  Two of his recent Cabinet appointments are endangered by revelations of malfeasance and two of his current Cabinet Ministers also face possible charges in the Lava-Jato investigation(s). With half of Brazil’s governors and 44% of the Senate accused of crimes involving corruption, bribes, and money laundering it must be difficult to find the proper combination of technical expertise and integrity. And it would appear that the current situation is just the beginning.

At least it now appears that the economy has “stopped worsening”. A bottoming out seems likely. Inflation will continue to rise for a while but the downward drift of the rate of GDP growth appears to have slowed slightly. 

Friday, 3 June 2016

BRAZIL-Is it that they just can't resist?

Or are they scared witless?

Not long ago on this blog I made reference to a very wise comment of one of my clients, the president of the local subsidiary of a large European MNC. He said he would give practically anything for just one executive who, when faced with a major decision, would say “Let’s think this through before we react.”

Life is full of clichés about the wisdom of “cautious delay”: “Let sleeping dogs lie”; “Don’t rush to judgment”; and the less famous one from New Jersey – “What’s your f****** hurry?”

They all suggest that moving too fast can sometimes cause more problems than it solves.

Such would seem to be the case with Dilma’s impeachment.

The administration seems to want to move her eventual trial faster and get a final verdict by August. The PT is, of course, livid with anger.

After all the debate that resulted in a Supreme Court decision to define, once and for all, the procedures to be followed for impeaching a president, the administration wants to change the rules. I guess Brazil’s politicians simply cannot resist fixing what ain’t broke.

Dilma is out of office for up to 180 days. She screams epithets from the back of the bar and for some crazy reason that I have yet to fathom she was given access to an Air Force jet to take her wherever she wants to go and preach her message of “coup d’état”. 

Since that damage is already done, it seems to me the best thing to do is just live with it. Anyway, the recent news coming out of Lava-Jato’s plea bargains continue to offer rather strong arguments against her claims of a “coup”.

The debate over Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment is being conducted, with significant and rather puerile verbal pushing and shoving, in a Special Senate Committee that will decide if the case goes to a plenary session in the Senate for judgment. 

If the committee votes against sending the case forward, it is closed and Dilma returns to office.

If the case is sent forward, the Senate must render a verdict within the 180-day period that Dilma is out of office to stand trial or she returns to office. She vacated office on 12 May so the Senate jury has up to around 12 November to come up with a verdict.

Dilma’s supporters on the committee engage in all manner of shenanigans to delay moving the process forward while the opposition tries to accelerate it.

Watching the debates on Tuesday, the 2nd, was a bit like watching a circus in which none of the acts was very professional. The jugglers dropped the articles they were juggling, the trapeze artists kept falling into the net, the lion tamer was attacked by one of the cats, the human pyramid of the gymnasts collapsed and the only act that seemed to be professional were the clowns whose chaos was at least amusing.

I simply fail to see what is to be gained from accelerating the trial now that Dilma is out of office. The economy already shows signs of “bottoming out” and stabilizing. Interim President Michel Temer has the power he needs to carry out his programs. He is auditing the social programs that were the showcase of the Rousseff and Lula administrations and finding a wide array of patronage and cronyism. He can probably cause more damage to the PT and its 13 years in government by simply exposing its screw-ups and malfeasance in the light of thorough audits than trying to speed things up.

Of course, the flip side of this desire to speed things up might increase the risk that Lava-Jato will come up with information that will compromise those in power as well as the PT. (That’s more like a certainty!) After all, the war being conducted is between two groups of kleptocrats, neither of which has an unblemished reputation for integrity and moral probity.

However, that risk is unavoidable whether Dilma is impeached immediately or in November. Lava-Jato simply cannot be stopped or stymied in its efforts to weed out corruption. 

Speeding up the impeachment process won’t change things one iota with regard to avoiding exposure going forward. As I wrote previously, when the tide goes out it’s easy to see who is swimming naked! And as we saw in my post on King Canute, no one, not even a great king, controls the tide!

So, it would appear that the adage that we should leave sleeping dogs lie is quite wise. I have yet to see many Brazilians who want to see Dilma back in office and would be inclined to change their minds about that. It has often been written in the press that while things might be bad with the traditional kleptocrats in charge, they would be worse if Dilma were to return to office.

So, what’s the f****** hurry? 

Wednesday, 1 June 2016

BRAZIL-2+2=?

Why now?

A very long time ago I published on this bog a quote from John Steinbeck’s book, The Log from the Sea of Cortez. I cited the quote as possibly the single most cogent explanation of what causes the development of a society. I won’t quote it again because it is relatively long.

In summary, Steinbeck suggests (in 1939, mind you) that when the isolation of a community is broken by highways and high-tension wires the result is irreversible. The world is brought into the community and things will never be the same. Trucks will be able to deliver products from outside, canned foods, and all of the “stuff” (both good and bad) of civilization. 

High-tension wires will deliver information, lighting and end the power of darkness over activities. 

In just a few paragraphs, Steinbeck summarized all the literature of development that economists still debate. In a broader sense, Steinbeck simply states that once a community can “communicate” with the outside world, the Zeitgeist of development takes over.

In another post I wrote on the difference between neurosis and psychosis. Psychotics have an internal logic all their own and might tell you that the sum of two plus two is 27, 3,000, or whatever number matches their internal logic. 

The neurotic, however, will tell you that the sum of two plus two is four but that he/she considers that result unacceptable. The neurotic knows reality but simply does not accept it.

I have attributed Brazil’s recent problems to the rejection by its politicians of the results of the Real Plan. I believe now that the attribution was only partially correct. The Real Plan’s salutary economic effects had the effect of facilitating the entrance of the outside world to Brazil. Digital technology became the vehicleby which it entered.

As Simon and Garfunkel sang in The Sounds of Silence, “the words of the prophets are written on the subway walls…”. The smart phones, tablets, laptops, etc. are the new “subway walls”. The Real Plan facilitated the purchase of those devices and made it possible for Brazilians of every social and economic level to independently discover and accept that 2+2=4.

For literally centuries, Brazil’s kleptocrats had kept Brazil relatively isolated in a highly closed, protectionist economy. They sold the view that two plus two could be whatever they could make it and that no one was obliged to accept the answer as 4.

The Internet was as liberating as were Steinbeck’s highways and high-tension wires.

Neither the traditional kleptocrats nor the “neo-kleptocrats” are satisfied with the acceptance by Brazilians of the equation. Each wanted to control the process of isolation in their own way but they do not agree on what two plus two should be if 4 is unacceptable to both. (Hence the mutually exclusive nature of their respective “models”).

To his credit, Michel Temer appears to have read the writing on the “subway walls”. He knows that the isolation has been broken, that Brazilians can now accept that 4 is the correct result. His challenge is not to “lead the people”. It is to convince his colleagues that the “game” has ended. The “people” have rejected the models of both the traditional kleptocrats and the neo-kleptocrats in favor of the acceptance of 4 as the correct answer of the sum of two plus two.

It remains for the “elites” to accept not only that number but also that the public is now “wise to their game”, and no longer isolated.  Brazilians are anxious to join the rest of the world. 

The combined effects of increased purchasing power (via the Real Plan) and the information that reaches the public over the high-tension wires of Steinbeck have rendered the kleptocratic “model” useless as a form of government. 

That’s why both the PT and the “traditionals” have been rejected. As Abraham Lincoln is reported to have said, “…you can’t fool all of the people all of the time.” Or, to quote once again economist Herb Stein, “Things that cannot go on forever, don’t”. It’s over! We still don’t know the eventual outcome, but the “game” as it had been played for centuries has ended.

Oh, there will still be those who confiscate the rents of society but their ability to do so with impunity has ended. Henceforth, they will be held accountable when they are caught.



Tuesday, 31 May 2016

BRAZIL-Machado's weekly audio "revelation"

Another cabinet minister bites the dust

Two incidents probably do not make a trend, but it’s a start. Former president of Transpetro, (a Petrobrás subsidiary) Sergio Machado released what could become his regular Monday audio recording of a telephone conversation regarding Lava-Jato. 

This call was to Cabinet Minister Fabiano Silveira, Minister of Transparency and Combat of Corruption. What was released to the TV news did not appear to be particularly criminal but Silveira did seem to be critical of Lava-Jato. That was sufficient to generate all manner of protests in the Temer administration’s legislative base of allies.

Silveira resigned yesterday. That’s two down!

I simply find it incredible that when Sergio Machado calls, people actually talk to him! Why not just say, “Hello Sergio, you called at a bad time. I’m very busy. I’ll call you back.” Then just never call! Machado says he has 6 hours of audio recordings so you can pretty well figure that he is also recording your conversation!

Are those who talk to him really that damned dumb or naive?

The other thing I find at least strange is that there is a Cabinet-level office dedicated to ensuring transparency and combatting corruption. Experience has taught me that ensuring transparency is simply a matter of controls, governance, and compliance (i.e. management) exercised at the proper level  of management and independently audited.

Combatting corruption is a police matter for the Judiciary to handle.

I have investigated corporate fraud in Brazil for nigh on 20 years and I’ve handled some pretty “hairy” cases. I have yet to see a case that did not involve some fragrant violation of straightforward and simple control and governance principles. Every one of the frauds could have been avoided or stopped in their tracks with appropriate controls and appropriate management.

As a matter of professional preference, I do not deal with public sector companies. I find them lacking in appropriate controls, procedures, and governance. It usually doesn’t require a lot of imagination to perpetrate a fraud in Brazil’s public sector!

I revert to the lessons of the 18 Century Enlightenment with regard to the underlying reasons for controls. Adam Smith postulated the Man is neither moral nor immoral but rather is motivated by self-interest. 

When you go to the shopping center you don’t lock your car because you are necessarily certain that someone will try to steal it or its contents. You also lock it  to keep “an honest person honest” and to make things difficult for a dishonest person. 

The same applies to applying controls in an enterprise. We do so not because employees are innately dishonest or honest but rather to ensure that they will perform their tasks in accordance with the rules and constraints that keepthem honest and protect the enterprise. And if they violate the rules, they face sanctions. That’s what I call “keeping it simple”.

At the enterprise level combatting corruption is usually a simple matter requiring only proper controls (sign-offs, verifications, audit, etc.) and a robust compliance policy.

Compliance is not simply a matter of ticking the boxes on the document flow. I once had a case in which a major service supplier’s address was a parking lot! Even if all the sign-offs and procedures associated with that service provider were totally in order, the fraud was also "in order"! Nobody had verified the actual physical existence of the provider or if the provider even rendered the contracted service. 

That is clearly not the way compliance is supposed to work! The paperwork was totally in order but the provider was not! Someone was responsible for that “oversight”, either by accident or design. “Accidents” should be disciplined and “designs” should be met by dismissal.

At the country level, especially a country like Brazil that requires a coalition of various political parties to govern, the problem is complex but the solution relatively simple. Brazil has a total of 35 political parties (and 35 presumed different ideologies?), and a reputation for bargaining political support on a “quid pro quo” basis often involving graft, kickbacks, bribes, etc. Trying to get the collective support of that many parties is like trying to pick up a turd by the “clean end”!

This is Michel Temer’s dilemma. While he has to satisfy the populace and get the economy in order, he can’t do it without a legislative base. With virtually every political party worried about getting caught up in the Lava-Jato investigations the “quid pro quo” offered to Temer by the parties is to restrain Lava-Jato. 

This is contrary to Temer’s solemn promise to the public that he will not inhibit Lava-Jato in any way, shape, or form and will not tolerate attempts to force him to choose between losing what little popular support he currently has or giving in to the demands of the parties in exchange for the policies that will get Brazil back on track and in the offing increase Temer's popular support. 

In short, there is simply no “clean end” to grasp, and the landscape is strewn with the turds left by the PT's 13-year use of the playing field.

It’s pretty clear that Sergio Machado’s strategy is to save his own skin by dragging as many members of Temer’s team as possible into the mud. If Temer allows the pressure to build he will find himself facing a serious confidence/credibility crisis.

If I were Temer’s crisis consultant (which I clearly am not!), I would recommend a "bare knuckles" aggressive response strategy. 

The first step would be to check with his Cabinet to see just how many members have spoken to Sergio Machado, when and about what

Any audios that pre-date the break between the PT and the PMDB should be noted.

The next step should be to "de-construct" Sergio Machado. It’s clear that he is seeking only to save his neck from the Lava-Jato noose. Most people repudiate that kind of cowardice and Temer should throw Machado under the bus ASAP!

For those conversations that pre-dated the end of the alliance of the PMDB with the PT the following responses might be prepared:
  • At the time of that recording we were an allied party of the PT coalition. That was in the early phases of the Lava-Jato investigation. As the extent of the PT’s corrupt schemes were exposed, we felt that the alliance was no longer in our interest as the party that put together the 1988 Constitution;
  • The PT was more strongly opposed to Lava-Jato than were we. In fact, as I wrote in my letter to Dilma, I was left out of the party’s major deliberations, and had become very upset with what I was seeing and hearing. I concluded that it was time to break the alliance;
  • The calls recorded by Machado were made prior to the break-up of the alliance when it was the PT that was strongly critical of Lava-Jato and we were allies;
For those calls that occurred after the split or could occur in the future: 
  • Temer needs to tell his cabinet members to simply refuse to talk to Machado; 
  • And if for any reason that is not possible and the subject of Lava-Jato should surface, the person should say that he/she does not think it proper as a member of an Executive Branch cabinet, to comment on actions of the Judiciary. (Mirroring the same comments made by Sergio Moro.)
  • He should also talk to the political patrons of his cabinet appointments to ensure that they “buy in” to the strategy to isolate Machado.
  • No one should mention the names of any politicians that come under the scrutiny of Lava-Jato; 
  • Temer should clearly state that an investigation is not necessarily an indictment and everyone, regardless of position, should be considered innocent until proven guilty. Allegations of a crime are not sufficient to prejudice someone’s career and reputation. 
  • We are trying to return Brazil to civilized dialog and discussion of our differences, not fan the flames of hateful rhetoric.
In my view, Temer has not been sufficiently forceful in this area. Either he has power or he does not. Against the PT’s thuggish and arrogant rhetoric he cannot afford to transmit any weakness or hesitancy.

He should also avoid creating any ministries that suggest that he is even worried about Lava-Jato (even if he is). And he should not show any fear whatsoever of the likes of Sergio Machado. Throw him to the wolves and forget about him!

That might do it! (Just a thought!)

Monday, 30 May 2016

BRAZIL-Three warnings and Temer's Challenge

You might have heard this story before

A newly-elected president entered his new office for the first time and found 3 sealed envelopes on his desk. On each envelope was written a message. On the first was the instruction: “To be opened on the occasion of you first major crisis”, the second and third envelopes had the same message for the second and third major crises, respectively. Skeptical but interested he put the three envelopes into a drawer. A few months into office the president had a major crisis and remembered the letters. He opened the first one to find the instruction: “To resolve this crisis, blame your predecessor. Good luck!” and was signed only, “A friend”. He did as instructed and it worked. Some time later he had a second major crisis. He opened the second envelope to find the instruction: “Blame the opposition. Good luck!” and was signed as before. It worked. Roughly a year later he had a third major crisis and now convinced of the wisdom of his anonymous friend, he opened the third envelope. He found the following instruction: “This is your third major crisis. Take out three sheets of paper and three envelopes. Sorry!” and signed as before.

Temer’s Challenge

Temer’s situation is rather similar. Having to modify his proposals could be his first major crisis. He has now come up against the threat of opposition to his four principal proposals: 1) To impose a limit on federal expenses; 2) To change the calculation method on retirement benefits; 3) To change the rules for pre-salt oil exploration to remove the requirement that Petrobrás have 30% of alloperations; 4) To establish rules of governance in the pension funds of state-owned companies.

As expected, the PT’s representatives in the Senate and in the Lower Chamber oppose all of the proposals. Proposals 1, 2, and 3 have run into snags as legislators want to “discuss” the proposals further.

Proposal 1 affects the two largest items in the federal budget: education and health. Both are considered political “plums” because they are subject to “earmarked” expenses that are required by law. The “earmarking” is a problem because allocations are not based on the performance of projects or personnel in their respective sectors. There are no performance demands on those in charge of the results of their areas of responsibilities so both the Education and Health ministries are wonderful places to insert “phantom” employees or total idiots who don’t know how to do anything. Clearly, the probability is high that the two ministries with the largest earmarked budget allocations are bloated with patronage appointments. It’s natural, therefore, that those legislators who negotiated those appointments will want to protect their prerogatives. Consequently, Temer’s dominant strategy in this case would seem to be to allow for extensive discussion in the legislature while conducting a thorough audit of both ministries to identify any “phantom employees” who don’t even show up to work, “idiots” who are in charge of nothing at all and/or any incidents of bribes, kickbacks, or other such malfeasance. He could then approach the patrons of those employees to threaten to have the information leaked to the press. The strongest pressure to discuss and change some items in this proposal is in the Lower Chamber. This chamber of the legislature is reportedly stillunder the control of suspended former president, Eduardo Cunha. However, Temer would be wise to avoid seeking counsel or assistance in that quarter. Dilma was recently quoted in an interview that Temer was “controlled” by Cunha. In short, Temer is wise in this case to assemble “facts” from independent or loyal sources and then use the information to “leverage” his findings in accordance with whatever modifications are proposed by the legislature or members thereof.

Proposal 2 is the suggestion to change the retirement rules of Brazil’s social security system. Those who most want to modify or oppose the current proposal are the labor unions that are allied to the PT. The proposal is based on the projection of the age distribution of the population over the next few decades when Brazil is likely to have fewer contributors to support a larger number of retirees. Maintenance of the current structure of the system would seriously affect Brazil’s economic growth. Only one party has declared to be in favor of the current proposal. All others want to discuss modifications. There are 48 votes in the Senate and 227 in the Lower Chamber for modification.

Proposal 3 to remove the requirement that Petrobrás have a 30% interest in all pre-salt exploration and drilling projects is totally favored and already approved in the Senate and has been approved there (with the exception of the PT that is against everything) but faces 123 votes in the Lower Chamber in favor of modifications.

Proposal 4 to impose stricter governance rules on public sector pension funds was already approved by the Senate and enjoys the favorable votes of 178 legislators in the Lower Chamber but 90 suggest need for modifications.

The figures suggest that the recommendation of the first letter, i.e. blame the previous administration, is a good one. Temer would be wise to pin as much controversy as possible on the Rousseff administration and the PT. He has only been president for just over two weeks so whatever resistance he encounters from the parties now allied to his administration can still be dealt with in the context of PT policies before he assumed office and the fact that he was excluded from the inner circle of Dilma’s principal allies and advisors. That might be enough to deal with the more recalcitrant members of his coalition. His dominant strategy is to keep them all talking and debating while he goes about negotiating support while he seeks to avoid any modifications that will retard the recovery of the fiscal accounts.

The table below provides the number of votes of each political party allied to the Temer administration and the disposition of each with regard to each proposal


Disposition of Votes per Party
Party
S
LC
#1
S
LC
#2
S
LC
#3
S
LC
#4
S
LC
PMDB
19
66

M
F

M
M

F
F

F
F
PSDB
11
51
M
M
M
M

F

F
PT
10
58
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
PP
6
49
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
M
PR
4
41
M
M
M
F
F
M
F
M
PSD
4
33
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
F
DEM
4
28
F
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
Others
23
187
?
?
?
?
F
?

?
Total
81
513

Where: # = no. of proposal; S = Senate; LC = Lower Chamber; M=modify, O=oppose; F=favoor

As the party that originated proposals 3 & 4 in the Senate, the PSDB did not have to cast its vote.

Temer has negotiating issues in both the Senate and the Lower Chamber on proposals 1 & 2 and negotiations on proposals 3 & 4 in the Lower Chamber only.
  
Reconciling all of the potentially conflicting interests and/or demands for patronage from the parties to the new coalition will be a formidable task and constitute Temer’s first major challenge. He can ill afford to “lose”.

Analysis:

To deal with the negotiations in the Lower Chamber, Temer is wise to avoid having to deal with Eduardo Cunha. As noted in the text above, Dilma stated in a recent interview that Cunha is the real power behind Temer. He can ill afford to seem to lend support to her claim.

If Cunha should lose his mandate either via the Lava-Jato investigation or the Parliamentary Inquiry regarding a violation of "decorum", Temer's ability to negotiate around Cunha's influence is enhanced.

Moreover, with 35 years in the Congress, Temer has a few friends of his own and as interim President he has considerable power so Dilma may have overestimated Cunha's power over Temer. Nevertheless, you can expect Cunha to "make a move on Temer" . 

There are signs that the economy has begun to respond favorably to Temer's proposals and this will also serve to strengthen his bargaining power with the Congress. He needs to rely on such improvements and generate public support to get what he needs to create the environment for recovery.

The plea bargains of both Sergio Machado and Pedro Correa (see previous posts) are potential "bombs" that could make Temer's negotiations more difficult and could affect the eventual votes in the Senate that might allow for the return of Dilma Rousseff to the presidency.

Temer's cabinet appointments continue to be challenged to the delight of the PT that continues to claim "moral superiority" and a conspiracy to keep it out of power and thus to carry out its proposed "reforms".   

It's an extremely complicated and difficult juggling act.